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NOTES
THE ASSAULT ON THE CITADEL OF PRIVILEGE
PROCEEDS APACE: THE UNREASONABLENESS
OF LAW OFFICE SEARCHES
INTRODUCTION
At approximately 9:00 a.m. on March 21, .1979, a number of agents
from the State Attorney General's office entered without notice the
offices of a California law firm.' Armed with a search warrant, the
agents sought to secure and seize from the office files documentary
evidence of criminal activity by one of the firm's corporate clients.2
The warrant permitted the search of "all rooms, lofts, attics, base-
ments, desks, closets, filing cabinets, safes, vaults, and all parts
therein" for records covering a five-year period, and referred to four
attachments containing nine pages with over seventy related entities,
persons, and documents. The agents assembled the attorneys in the
reception area until the floor was "secured." 4 They rummaged
through private offices and examined private papers in desks and on
tabletops.' Despite an agreement to produce the relevant files, the
officers continued to inspect the firm's centralized file catalogue, and
required the production of thirty additional files.6  The search con-
tinued for over three hours, terminating when a temporary restrain-
ing order was issued by a Superior Court Judge.7 The agents left
without taking any of the material specified in the warrant.8
Unfortunately, this account is neither fictionalized nor
uncommon.' Currently, in only two states, a search warrant may not
issue ex parte to authorize the search of an attorney's office for evi-
dence if the attorney's client is the subject of a criminal
1. Deukmejian v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 253, 256, 162 Cal. Rptr.
857, 859 (1980). The firm searched was Kaplan, Livingston, Goodwin, Berkowitz &
Selvin, a Beverly Hills law firm of approximately 62 lawyers.
2. Id. at 255-56, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
3. Id., 162 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
4. Id., 162 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
5. Levine, Proposed Legislation, in Searching A Delicate Balance, L.A. Law.,
Oct. 1979, at 12, 51. One of the firm's attorneys said in a sworn statement that the
police reviewed the records of many other clients and the personal papers of the
attorneys.
6. Tarlow, Law Office Searches, 6 Forum, Sept.-Oct. 1979, at 14.
7. Deukmejian v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 253, 256, 162 Cal. Rptr.
857, 859 (1980).
8. Id. at 256, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
9. Extensive law office searches have occurred in California, see Tarlow, supra
note 6, at 14-15 (an account of four law office searches in California); Wash. Post,
May 31, 1979, § A, at 3, col. 1 (refers to 24 Southern California law firms that had
been searched), in Minnesota, see O'Connor v. Johnson, - Minn. -, 287 N.W.2d
400 (1979) (en banc) (search for business records of client suspected of fraud in liquor
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investigation."0 Law office searches have been made under the aegis
of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily," in which the Supreme Court held that
the fourth amendment does not prohibit the use of a search warrant
merely because the owner of the place to be searched is an innocent
party to the investigation, and a subpoena may be a practical
alternative. 2 Although a literal reading of Zurcher appears to sup-
port the constitutionality of law office searches,"' the Court estab-
lished that reasonableness is a consideration, separate from particular-
ity and probable cause, for the magistrate issuing a search warrant for
a nonsuspect target."' Because the quantum of reasonableness in-
herent in any search may vary depending on the material sought and
the area involved, 15 some searches may be unreasonable even though
supported by probable cause. 6
Using the criteria established in Zurcher,'7 this Note argues that
law office searches are unreasonable because society's interest in
effective law enforcement" does not outweigh its interest in protect-
ing the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship.'6 The use
license application), in New York, see National City Trading Corp. v. United States,
487 F. Supp. 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (search for business records of client suspected of
boiler room sales of commodities), in Oregon, see 125 Cong. Rec. S14975 (daily ed.
Oct. 23, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Bayh) (search and seizure of more than 1,000 pages
of documents in connection with an embezzelment investigation of client), and in
Texas. See Bloom, The Law Office Search: An Emerging Problem and Some Sug-
gested Solutions, 69 Geo. L.J. 1, 5 n.21 (1980) (police searched all of the files of a
murdered attorney's clients looking for clues). Law office searches have also become
a problem in Canada. See Schnoor, Privilege- Solicitor and Client-Whether Ap-
plicable to Powers of Search and Seizure, 7 Manitoba L.J. 341 (1977).
10. In California, recent legislation has restricted the use of search warrants for
law offices. Cal. Penal Code § 1524 (West Supp. 1981). In Minnesota, a search war-
rant for a nonsuspect attorney's office was unreasonable and violated the fourth
amendment. The court directed the officers to proceed by subpoena. O'Connor v.
Johnson, - Minn. - 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (1979) (en bane).
11. 436 U.S. 547 (1978); see 1 W. Ringel, Searches & Seizures. Arrests and Con-
fessions § 2.5, at 2-15 to 2-16 (2d ed. 1980). Justice Stevens predicted that law office
searches would occur as a result of the Zurcher decision. 436 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J.
dissenting).
12. 436 U.S. at 560-63.
13. National City Trading Corp. v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1332, 1334-35
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
14. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559, 565-66, 570 (1978).
15. Id. at 564-65, 569-70.
16. Id. at 559-60 ("[t]his is not to question that *reasonableness' is the overriding
test of compliance with the Fourth Amendment or to assert that searches . . . may
never be unreasonable if supported by a warrant issued on probable cause and prop-
erly identifying the place to be searched and the property to be seized").
17. Id. at 570 (Powell, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 554-55; Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976). Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972).
19. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 480-81 (1966).
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of a search warrant to secure information in an attorney's custody20
circumvents the assertion of the attorney-client privilege and the
work product doctrine, thereby exposing normally unobtainable con-
fidential information to the police.21  Although privileged items can
be suppressed after the search,21 "[o]nce that information is revealed
to the police, the privileges are lost, and the information cannot be
erased from the minds of the police."3 The deleterious impact of
these searches on the goals of the attorney-client privilege,24 the
work product doctrine,- and the fourth 6 and sixth amendment"2
rights of the investigation's target-the client-cannot be gainsaid.
Legislatures have attempted to alleviate this problem by enacting
protective legislation. The Zurcher Court specifically invited this type
of legislation, indicating that Congress and the states could limit the
use of third party search warrants.2 The Justice Department, pur-
20. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 405-14 (1976); Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973).
21. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 561-62 & n.8 (1978); Jones, The
Aftermath of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily: The Need for Legislation to Prohibit Third
Party Search Warrants for Lawyers' Files, 15 Ariz. B.J., Feb. 1980, at 11, 18.
22. In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co. 466 F. Supp. 863,
868 (D. Minn. 1979), aff'd as qualified, 629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980).
23. O'Connor v. Johnson, - Minn. -, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (1979) (en bane).
24. Confidential communications between an attorney and his client are priv-
ileged and not subject to compelled disclosure absent consent of the client. Diversi-
fied Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 601 (8th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part en banc, 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1978). See generally Hazard, An Historical
Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 Cal. L. Rev. 1061 (1978); Note, The
Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91
Harv. L. Rev. 464 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Attorney-Client Privilege].
25. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975); Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 508 (1947).
26. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589 (1974); Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298, 304 (1921).
27. See generally United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223-27 (1967); Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-92 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40
(1963).
28. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). The fourth amendment does
not prevent establishment of statutory protections against abuses of the search war-
rant procedure. Id. at 567. Moreover, the states can impose higher standards on
their law enforcement officials than those required by the Constitution. North Caro-
lina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 376 n.7 (1979); Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 719
(1975); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940). Many state courts
have granted greater protection based on state constitutions or statutes. See, e.g.,
State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 260, 492 P.2d 657, 661 (1971) (Hawaii constitution
forbids introduction of evidence concerning defendant's criminal record when testify-
ing); State v. Sklar, 317 A.2d 160, 165 (Me. 1974) (Maine constitution guarantees
right to jury trial in all criminal prosecutions); O'Connor v. Johnson, - Minn. -,
287 N.W.2d 400, 404 (1979) (en bane) (Minnesota constitution required consideration
of the sixth amendment right to counsel in determining the reasonableness of a
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suant to the Privacy Protection Act of 1980,2 has promulgated guide-
lines that purportedly regulate federally conducted law office
searches.' In California, the legislature recently responded to the
legal profession's concernsM3 by enacting legislation requiring a proce-
dure that is a compromise between the use of a search warrant and a
subpoena for securing information in an attorney's custody.Y2 This
Note analyzes the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, the Guidelines
promulgated by the Justice Department, and the California legisla-
tion. In conclusion, this Note suggests alternatives to the search war-
rant that are less restrictive of the statutory and constitutional rights
of the attorney and his client.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REQUIREMENT OF REASONABLENESS
A. The Zurcher Balance
The primary purpose of the fourth amendment is to protect the
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy 3 from unreasonable
search). The trend toward broader interpretation of state constitutional provisions
equivalent to the fourth amendment has been encouraged in recent Supreme Court
decisions. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 116-24 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 395-96 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). See also 1 W. Ringel, supra note 11, § 2.6, at 2-16 (2d ed. 1980); Bloom,
supra note 9, at 51; Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 498-500 (1977); 4 Hamline L. Rev. 165, 168 (1980).
29. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 1882.
30. 46 Fed. Reg. 1302 (1981) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 59).
31. The Attorney General's Office is on record as stating that if they are "investi-
gating a white-collar criminal and need specific documentary evidence of his crime,
[they] have no compunctions about . . . getting a search warrant [for the offices of
his lawyer], and ... will." Search-warrant fever spreads to Calif. firms, 65
A.B.A.J. 886-87 (1979).
32. Cal. Penal Code § 1524 (West Supp. 1981); see pt. II (B) infra.
33. The term "reasonable expectation of privacy" originated in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Justice Harlan stated that a reasonable expectation of
privacy is a subjective expectation that society would find reasonable. Id. at 361
(Harlan, J., concurring). This language was subject to varying interpretations. Kitch,
Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. Ct. Rev. 133,
137; Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 Rutgers L. Rev. 275, 276 (1974); Stone, The
Scope of the Fourth Amendment: Privacy and the Police Use of Spies, Secret Agents
and Informers, 1976 Am. B. Foundation Research J. 1193, 1212; Weinreb, Generali-
ties of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 47, 83 (1974). In Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128 (1978), the Supreme Court further refined the definition by stating that
a privacy expectation is legitimated by "a source outside of the fourth amendment,"
by reference to property rights, or to understandings that are recognized and permit-
ted by society. Id. at 143-44 n.12. Additional considerations are whether the person
has taken precautions customarily taken by one seeking privacy, and has used the
place to be searched in the manner of one expecting privacy. Id. at 153 (Powell, J.,
concurring). The attorney and client's expectation of privacy is legitimated by the
sixth amendment and the common-law privileges accorded attorney-client coin-
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governmental intrnsion.3' The fourth amendment does not make the
home or office a sanctuary beyond the reach of the law, but it does
guarantee that the government will not search and seize without
probable cause or in a procedurally improper manner.Y The first
clause of the fourth amendment institutes a "right . . .to be secure
...against unreasonable searches and seizures."' 36  The second
clause lists specific requisites for the issuance of a valid warrant.31 The
relationship between these clauses has generated an ongoing debate.-
munications. Their privacy expectation is one that is permitted and recognized by
society. Attorneys and their clients use the attorney's office in the manner of people
expecting privacy and in reliance on the common-law protections of their privacy.
Attorneys, moreover, have a property interest in their office that legitimates their
privacy expectations. Therefore, attorneys and their clients have a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy protected by the fourth amendment.
34. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 159-60 (1978) (White, J., dissenting); Card-
well v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589 (1974); see Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298,
303-04 (1921). See generally Bayh, Police Searches of Innocent Third Parties: A Con-
gressional Response to Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 6 J. Legis. 7, 11 (1979) ("privacy
rights are . . .controlling factors when discussing fourth amendment questions");
O'Brien, Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: Principles and Policies of Fourth
Amendment-Protected Privacy, 13 New England L. Rev. 662, 673 (1978)
("[p]ersonal privacy attains its principal constitutional protection and closest approx-
imation of express recognition in the guarantees of the fourth amendment"). The
requirements of the fourth amendment were made applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled in part,
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
35. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63-64 (1967). General warrants and unre-
stricted searches are prohibited. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467
(1971); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965); Marron v. United States, 275
U.S. 192, 195-96 (1927).
36. U.S. Const. amend. IV, cI. 1.
37. Id., cl. 2. The manner in which a warrant is executed is mandated by Fed.
R. Crim. P. 41(c), (d), comparable state statutes, see Cal. Penal Code §§ 1530-1538
(West 1970 & Supp. 1979); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 780.652-.656 (West 1968);
Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 968.14-.20 (West 1971 & Supp. 1980), and the "knock and
announce" statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1976). These rules specify the period of the
warrant's validity, the time of day it may be executed, the manner in which the
executing officers may enter the premises to be searched, and the ministerial re-
quirements regarding the disposition of the property seized. See Langhorne, Formal
Requirements For Execution of Search Warrant, 6 Search & Seizure L. Rep., Sept.
1979, at 1. The issuance of a warrant must be based on probable cause, the certainty
that the items sought are present in the place to be searched. Probable cause lies
between bare suspicion and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Armentano, The Stan-
dards for Probable Cause Under the Fourth Amendment, 44 Conn. B.J. 137, 144
(1970); see Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in Flux: The Rise and Fall of Probable
Cause, 1979 U. I11. L.F. 763. The magistrate has a duty to investigate the truthful-
ness of the material allegations of the affidavit supporting the warrant so that chal-
lenges may be properly entertained during suppression hearings. State v. Davenport,
510 P.2d 78, 82 (Alaska 1973). The magistrate must eliminate searches not based on
probable cause, and he must ensure that "those searches deemed necessary [are] as
limited as possible." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
38. As Justice White has aptly stated, "translation of the abstract prohibition
against 'unreasonable searches and seizures' into workable guidelines for the decision
(Vol. 49
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The reasonableness clause has generally been the basis of court
decisions determining the validity of a warrantless search and
seizure.39 It is usually assumed that a search is reasonable if the
express requirements of the warrant clause, probable cause and
particularity, are satisfied.4" A second view has been advanced,
however, that the warrant clause places procedural requirements on
the government's power to search, while the reasonableness clause
imposes a substantive limitation."' Thus, all warrants must fulfill the
requirements of the warrant clause and must additionally be adjudged
reasonable. Inherent in this view is a hierarchy of fourth amendment
protection recognizing that the threshhold of reasonableness increases
as the privacy expectations affected by the search increase." For ex-
ample, a warrant "sufficient to support the search of an apartment or
an automobile [would not necessarily] be reasonable in supporting
the search of a newspaper office." '4
Although support for the view that the warrant clause and the
reasonableness clause have a concurrent application can be found in
prior opinions," the Court's opinion in Zurcher is most supportive of
of particular cases is a difficult task which has for many years divided the members of
this Court." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). see O'Brien,
supra note 35, at 675-77; Stelzner, The Fourth Amendment: The Reasonableness and
Warrant Clauses, 10 N.M.L. Rev. 33, 34-35 (1979); Comment, Third Party Searches
In The Face of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily: Toward A Set of Reasonableness Require-
ments, 11 Conn. L. Rev. 660, 661-62 (1979). See generally Amsterdam, Perspectives
On The Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349 (1974).
39. See, e.g., G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 358 (1977)
(warrantless entry of business premises unreasonable); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (warrantless seizure of car unreasonable); Terry v. Ohio.
392 U.S. 1, 20-23, 30 (1968) (warrantless search of individual reasonable).
40. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967); see McKenna, The
Constitutional Protection of Private Papers: The Role of a Hierarchical Fourth
Amendment, 53 Ind. L.J. 55, 81 (1977); O'Brien, supra note 34, at 707, 713.
41. McKenna, supra note 40, at 81-84. "The two clauses of the fourth amend-
ment are grammatically independent and there is no conceptual obstacle to a holding
that the reasonableness requirement 'transcends the procedural safeguards of particu-
larity and probability in the second clause."' Id. at 81 (quoting T. Taylor, Two Stud-
ies in Constitutional Interpretation 67 (1969)).
42. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978) ("[t]he showing of probable
cause necessary to secure a warrant may vary with the object and intrusiveness of the
search"); United States v. Hubbard, 493 F. Supp. 209, 0-26 (D.D.C. 1979) (a
standard of reasonableness is applied to judge the scope of a search wvith a %arrant).
43. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 569-70 (1978) (Powell, J., concur-
ring). Compare South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976) (a car search)
and Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589 (1974) (same) with United States v. United
States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314-17 (1972) (electronic surveillance of a home)
and Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968) (office search).
44. Relying on an historical analysis of the fourth amendment's drafting, Justice
Douglas argued that the fourth amendment clauses operate independently. Warden
19811
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this position, at least in the context of a nonsuspect third party
search. In Zurcher, the Court was not considering a warrantless
search and seizure, for the Stanford Daily's offices were searched pur-
suant to a valid warrant.4" Yet, the Court repeatedly asserted that
"'reasonableness' is the overriding test of compliance with the Fourth
Amendment,"46 and consistently listed reasonableness as a standard
separate from the warrant clause requirements. 7
The Zurcher majority did not specifically articulate a balancing test
to assess reasonableness, stating that "[t]he Fourth Amendment has
itself struck the balance between privacy and public need.""6 In
effect, however, the Court weighed the Stanford Daily's interests
against the public's interest in law enforcement and upheld the
search because its intrusiveness was properly limited by the warrant
requirements of the fourth amendment-"probable cause, specificity,
... and overall reasonableness."' 9  The Zurcher Court thus applied
the balancing test historically required by the Court in fourth amend-
ment cases 5 -the need for the search on the one hand, and the
threat of disruption to the occupant on the other."
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 313-25 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325-27 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting), Justice Stevens
also advocates the same view.
45. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 551 (1978).
46. Id. at 559; see Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973) ("[t]he ulti
mate standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness").
47. The Zurcher Court referred to the magistrate's responsibility to issue war-
rants and determine the reasonableness of a search. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
U.S. 547, 564 (1978). The Court emphasized that "[a] seizure reasonable as to one
type of material in one setting may be unreasonable in a different setting or with
respect to another kind of material." Id. (quoting Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496,
501 (1973)). The Court listed "probable cause, specificity with respect to the place to
be searched and the things to be seized, and overall reasonableness" as the precondi-
tions for a warrant. Id. at 565. It also listed "specificity and reasonableness" as re-
quirements to safeguard privacy. Id. at 566. Most significantly, the Court indicated
that a search that met the warrant requirements might nevertheless be adjudged
unreasonable. Id. at 559-60. In Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), decided on
the same day as Zurcher, the Court directed the magistrate issuing a search warrant
for an administrative inspection following a fire "to assure that the proposed search
will be reasonable, a determination that requires inquiry into the need for the intru-
sion on the one hand, and the threat of disruption to the occupant on the other." Id.
at 507; see Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 480 F. Supp. 1078, 1084-86
(D.D.C. 1979).
48. Zurcher v. Stanfbrd Daily, 436 U.S. at 559.
49. Id. at 565.
50. To assess reasonableness one must balance "its impact on the individual's
sense of security . . . against the utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforce-
ment." United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971). "The standard of reason-
ableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment demands that the showing of justifica-
tion match the degree of intrusion." Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 69 (1967)
(Stewart, J., concurring in the result); see United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 900
(1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
51. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 507 (1978).
[Vol. 49
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Criteria for assessing the disruption threatened by a search of a
nonsuspect third party are listed in Justice Powell's concurring opin-
ion in Zurcher. In Justice Powell's view, which he maintained was
also that of the majority,n the requirement of reasonableness compels
the magistrate to consider five factors. These are (1) the description of
the evidence sought, its nature and significance,I (2) the premises to
be searched,-5 (3) the position and interests of the owner or
occupant,n (4) the magnitude of the proposed search,- and (5) the
constitutional values affected.s
The Zurcher Court underscored the need for the search in its
emphasis of the public interest in implementing the criminal law.'
In the Court's opinion, this need is most effectively served by the use
of a warrant because the delay inherent in the use of a subpoena
involves hazards to criminal investigation. Warrants are often used
early in an investigation when the identities of all suspects are not
known.-" The Court feared that third parties may not always be in-
nocent or may be sympathetic to the culpable parties,o and might
therefore destroy or conceal the evidence if given advance notice of
the prosecution's interest in the information.6' The recipient of a
subpoena may also assert the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination and thus frustrate the government's efforts to obtain the
52. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 570 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
53. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
54. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
55. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 570 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 570 (Powell, J., concurring). The Zurcher Court indicated that it did
not believe that there would be any chilling effect on press access to confidential
sources as a result of the search. Therefore, there would be no constitutional viola-
tion. Id. at 566. Moreover, the Court has not recognized a newsman's privilege of
confidentiality. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-91 (1972). Furthermore,
much of the information in a newspaper office is intended for publication, and the
newspaper cannot claim a fourth amendment expectation of privacy in such informa-
tion. The Supreme Court has stressed that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public... is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); cf. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435. 442 (1976) (no
reasonable expectation of privacy in banking records); Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in records given to
accountant for tax preparation). See also O'Brien, supra note 34, at 734-36; 26 De-
Paul L. Rev. 146 (1976).
58. Zurcher v. United States, 436 U.S. at 560-63.
59. Id. at 561.
60. The Court feared that the custodian of the incriminating material would de-
stroy it or would notify the suspect. The Court also feared that the suspect would
have access to the material and might destroy it. Id. The staff of the Stanford Daily
had announced a policy of destroying evidence sought by the police in connection
with demonstrations. Id. at 568 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 561.
1981]
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evidence. 6 Finally, the Court argued that search warrants are more
difficult to obtain than subpoenas. The rational prosecutor, therefore,
will not use a search warrant when it is inappropriate.'
The Zurcher Court, considering these factors, held that the search
of a nonsuspect third party is not unreasonable per se and all third
parties do not deserve special fourth amendment protection. This de-
cision emphasizes that no area is inherently private; 11 rather, an indi-
vidual's actual expectations of privacy are determined to be reason-
able and protected by reference to the place searched and the
circumstances." Therefore, the Zurcher holding does not preclude a
finding that some third parties deserve and require special protection
because they may be uniquely situated.
B. Impact On Attorney-Client Interests
Attorneys and their clients may require special protection from
search warrants because they are uniquely situated. The attorney-
client relationship has been accorded safeguards 6 by society in the
interest of the effective functioning of the adversary system,," which
preserves the dignity of the individual by assuring that he is given
protective rights against the power of the state." These safeguards
62. Id. at 561 n.8. To hold a search and seizure constitutionally permissible
under the fourth amendment because the use of a subpoena might lead to the valid
invocation of one's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination seems anoma-
lous. "If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system
of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with that system." Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964) (footnotes omitted).
63. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 562-63. The Court failed to recognize
that prosecutors may prefer warrants to subpoenas. The use of a warrant avoids
litigation prior to the seizure of the evidence. Additionally, a warrant allows the
officers to inspect materials themselves without relying on the good faith of the sub-
poenaed party and to discover undisclosed or otherwise unavailable evidence. Sec
Tarlow, supra note 6, at 15-16; The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 Harv. L. Rev.
57, 207-08 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Term].
64. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 554-55; see Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places").
65. Kitch, supra note 33, at 136 ("[iut is not the nature of the area . . . but the
relationship between the area and the person incriminated by the search that is
critical").
66. Attorneys have been granted state statutory privileges from revealing the
contents of their files. See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 622.10 (West 1980) (attorney not
allowed to disclose client's secrets); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-503 (1979) (client has priv-
ilege to refuse disclosure); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 905.03(2) (West 1975) (same). Fed. R.
Evid. 501 establishes a general rule of privilege that makes the common law in the
jurisdiction in which the federal court is sitting applicable in federal litigation.
67. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975); ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility, Preamble (1976); M. Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary Sys-
tem 1-9 (1975); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2291, at 545 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton
1961).
68. See M. Freedman supra note 67, at 2-4. "[T]he Constitution of the United
States . . .attempts to preserve the dignity of the individual and to do that guaran-
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are provided by the attorney-client privilege, the work product doc-
trine, and the sixth amendment.
1. The Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is supportive of the goals of the adver-
sary system. The privilege, "born of the law's o\vn complexity, 9 is
designed to encourage clients to consult candidly with their attor-
neys, thereby facilitating effective representation. ' The privilege ex-
tends to verbal statements, documents, and tangible objects conveyed
by both individual and corporate clients to the attorney in confidence
for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.-' Although the privilege
tees him the services of an attorney who will bring to the Bar ... every conceivable
protection from the inroads of the State against such rights as are vested in the
Constitution for one accused of crime." People v. Beige, 83 Misc. 2d 186, 190, 372
N.Y.S.2d 798, 801-02 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 50 A.D.2d 1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (4th
Dep't. 1975), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 359 N.E.2d 377, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976).
69. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 406 F. Supp. 381, 388 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
70. United States v. Upjohn Co., 49 U.S.L.W. 4093, 4094 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1981)
(No. 79-886); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); Natta v. Hogan, 392
F.2d 686, 691 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v. Grand Jury Investigation, 401 F.
Supp. 361, 369-70 (W.D. Pa. 1975); In re Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13, 15 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), aff'd sub nom. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962). cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); O'Connor v. Johnson, - Minn. - 287 N.W.2d 400,
402-03 (1979) (en banc). The attorney-client privilege is the oldest common law pri-
vilege. Recognized at the time of Elizabeth I, it was part of the code of honor of the
English attorney, who, as a gentleman, could not violate a pledge of secrecy. Later.
the rationale for the privilege changed to the necessity of assuring the client that
information conveyed to the attorney in confidence would be safe from disclosure
even at the hands of the law. The privilege now belongs to the client, rather than
the attorney. 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 67, § 2290. at 542-45; see United States v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915) (noting the privilege's well
established role in the American legal system). The modern justification for the priv-
ilege "is to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys ... to obtain
fully informed legal advice." Fisher v. United States, 42.5 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (cita-
tions omitted).
71. "(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4)
made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7)
from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be
waived." 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 67, § 22-92, at 554 (footnote omitted); see In re
Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 89 F.Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950). The attorney-client privilege applies in
judicial proceedings and in investigative proceedings conducted by administrative
agencies. United States v. Summe, 208 F. Supp. 925, 927 (E.D. Ky. 1962); CAB v.
Air Transp. Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 318, 318 (D.D.C. 1961). Confidential attorney-client
communications are also protected in grand jury investigations, In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Duffy), 473 F.2d 840, 841-42 (8th Cir. 1973); Continental Oil Co. v.
United States, 330 F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1964); see United States v. Calandra, 414
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belongs to the client and only he may waive it, 2 the attorney may
assert the privilege on the client's behalf.73
The attorney's common-law obligation to maintain the secrecy of
his communications with his client is made a professional mandate by
the Canons of Ethics. 74 The goal of this ethical obligation is to pro-
mote the full development of facts essential to effective
representation. 7 The attorney is subject to sanctions, and even dis-
barment, for breaching this obligation of confidentiality,"6 which is
broader than the attorney-client privilege.'
U.S. 338, 346 (1974), and in legislative committee hearings. See United States v.
Keeney, 111 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 218 F.2d 843
(D.C. Cir. 1954). The privilege extends to both individual and corporate clients.
Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane);
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F2d 314, 319 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
72. C. McCormick, Law of Evidence § 92, at 192 (2d ed. 1972); see People v.
Doyle, 74 Cal. App. 3d 691, 692, 141 Cal. Rptr. 639, 641 (1977) (consent of an
attorney to a warrantless search of a client's files was held ineffective as only the
client may waive the privilege).
73. C. McCormick, supra note 72, § 92, at 192-94. The client may assert the
privilege even though he is not directly involved in the dispute in which the priv-
ileged testimony is sought. Id. at 192-93.
74. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 4-1 (1976). "Both the fiduciary
relationship existing between lawyer and client and the proper functioning of the
legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of confidences and secrets of one
who has employed . . . him. A client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes
with his lawyer .... A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter
he is handling in order for his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system."
Id.
75. id.
76. Id. DR 4-101(A), (B)(1); e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e) (West 1974)
(attorney required to "maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself
to preserve the secrets, of his client"); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 481.06(5) (West 1971)
(attorney required to keep inviolate the confidences of his client); Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 9.460(5) (1979) (same as California statute); see Lawyer Scolded For Airing Client's
Perjury Strategy, Nat'l L.J., July 28, 1980, at 3, col. 2 (Attorney revealed to judge
client's desire to use perjured testimony and asked to withdraw from the case. The
lawyer was not allowed to withdraw and was chastized by the district court and the
court of appeals for revealing his client's intentions). But see Frankel, The Search
For Truth-An Umpireal View, 30 Rec. A. Bar City N.Y. 14, 15 (1975) ("our adver-
sary system rates truth too low among the values that institutions of justice are meant
to serve"). The Kutak Commission, appointed by the A.B.A. to draft a new code of
ethics, has suggested a decrease in the confidentiality requirements of the current
code. A.B.A.'s Comm'n on Evaluation of Professional Standards, Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct 14-19 (1980); Kaufman, A Critical First Look at the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 66 A.B.A.J. 1074, 1077 (1980). See generally, Comment, The
Attorney's Obligation of Confidentiality-Its Effect on the Ascertainment of Truth in
an Adversary System of Justice, 3 Glendale L. Rev. 81 (1980).
77. The obligation of confidentiality exists without regard to the nature or source
of the information or the fact that it is known by others. ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility, EC 4-4 (1976).
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The results of allowing a search of law offices would be devastating.
During a law office search, not only would the attorney-client priv-
ilege be violated with respect to the client under investigation,' but
the rights of other clients represented by the attorney would be
violated as the police inspected their files as well., These "fourth
parties" have entrusted confidential information to the attorney, and
their rights should be respected. Furthermore, "fourth parties"
whose rights are violated by a law office search face the severe prob-
lem presented by the "plain view" doctrine of the fourth
amendment." Under this doctrine, any property that inadvertently
comes into view during the course of a legitimate search is subject to
warrantless seizure. The necessity of probable cause to believe that
papers and effects have evidentiary value is the only limitation on the
government's right to seize them." A law office search could thus
become a treasure hunt for information unrelated to the specific
investigation. '
The most serious problem posed by a law office search, however, is
its chilling effect on attorney-client communications. A client will be
understandably reluctant to reveal potentially damaging information
to his attorney if he believes that it may become available to the
police.' Without complete disclosure of all relevant information, the
78. A client's reasonable expectation of privacy as to information maintained by
his attorney in his files is not predicated on whether the material falls within the
attorney-client privilege. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S 322, 350 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); People v. Doyle, 74 Cal. App. 3d 691, 691, 141 Cal. Rptr. 639, 640
(1977). Therefore, a law office search results in a breach of not only the attorney-
client privilege, but also of the client's expectations of privacy.
79. O'Connor v. Johnson, - Minn. ., 287 N.W.2d 400, 404 (1979) (en banc).
Following the search of attorney Milton Stewart's office in Oregon, two lawyers shar-
ing offices with Stewart stated that they would seek dismissal of charges against their
clients because police looked through their files during the search. 125 Cong. Rec.
S14975 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
80. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-72 (1971).
81. United States v. Hubbard, 493 F. Supp. 209, 231-33 (D.D.C. 1979); State v.
Hawkins, 255 Or. 39, 41-42, 463 P.2d 858, 859-60 (1970); see Andresen v. Maryland,
427 U.S. 463, 481-84 (1976) (court approved plain-view seizure of business records).
82. Bekavac, Third Party Searches, in Searching A Delicate Balance, L.A. Law.,
Oct. 1979, at 12, 14; Tarlow, supra note 6, at 16-17; Comment, Search and Seizure
of Attorneys' Offices As Violative of Attorney-Client Privilege, 3 Crim. Just. J. 359,
379-80 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Search and Seizure].
83. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); M. Freedman, supra note
67, at 4-5; Tarlow, supra note 6, at 17. "This 'chilling effect' may lead to the convic-
tion of innocent persons who hesitate to divulge information which, for instance, may
be embarassing, may seem incriminating, or may implicate other persons in crimes."
Note, Government Interceptions of Attorney-Client Communications, 49 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 87, 88 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Government Interceptions].
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attorney cannot give competent legal advice.'" Thus, searches will
undermine the trust and candor essential to the attorney-client rela-
tionship and render nugatory the purpose of the attorney-client priv-
ilege.
2. The Work Product Doctrine
The work product doctrine,' which is "distinct from and broader
than the attorney-client privilege,"" also advances the goals of the
adversary system. The doctrine shelters from opposing counsel the
"interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental
impressions, personal beliefs, and . . . other tangible and intangible"
information an attorney assembles in his preparation of a case for
trial-' The doctrine may encompass documents prepared by or for
the attorney,"' and may be asserted by the attorney and the client,"9
in either civil or criminal cases.' The purpose of the doctrine is to
84. United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915). "If
such communications were required to be made the subject of examination and pub-
lication, such enactment would be a practical prohibition upon professional advice
and assistance." Id.
85. The work product doctrine was developed as a qualified privilege by the
Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
86. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.11 (1975); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 801 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Murphy, 560
F.2d 326, 337 (8th Cir. 1977).
87. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947); accord, Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 49 U.S.L.W. 4093, 4097 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1981) (No. 79-886) (mental processes
of attorney); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975) (same). For a history
of the privilege, see In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Duffy), 473 F.2d 840, 844-47 (8th
Cir. 1973).
88. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Duffy), 473 F.2d 840, 847 (8th Cir. 1973); In
re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943, 948 (E.D.Pa. 1976). The
doctrine protects materials after the termination of the litigation; In re Murphy, 560
F.2d 326, 334-35 (8th Cir. 1977), and materials prepared for the attorney by agents
such as investigators. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239-40 (1975). Materials
prepared in the ordinary course of business, however, are not protected. Hercules
Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 150-51 (D. Del. 1977); Fontaine v. Sun-
flower Beef Carrier, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 89, 91 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
89. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 801 (3d Cir.
1979).
90. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975); In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings (Duffy), 473 F.2d 840, 846 (8th Cir. 1973); see State v. Bowen, 104 Ariz.
138, 144, 449 P.2d 603, 607 (en banc) (defendant is not entitled to examine work
product of prosecutor), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 912 (1969); Fisher v. State, 241 Ark.
545, 548-49, 408 S.W.2d 894, 897 (1966) (prosecuting attorney's work product un-
available to the defense), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 821 (1967). The work product doc-
trine can be asserted both before and during trial and is a valid ground for refusal of
a grand jury subpoena. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Duffy), 473 F.2d 840, 842 (8th
Cir. 1973); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943, 946 (E.D. Pa.
1976). Work product materials can be discovered in civil cases by showing that the
material was not prepared in anticipation of litigation or that there is a substantial
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ensure the attorney the privacy essential to the thorough preparation
and presentation of his case for trial." The Supreme Court feared
that without such protection attorneys would leave unwritten much of
the information important to the efficient preparation of a case to the
detriment of the legal profession and the justice system.Y:
During a law office search, the police vill inevitably view the attor-
ney's work product materials, including his investigations and defense
plans. a This exposure of essential evidence and trial strategy would
circumvent the espoused purpose of the work product doctrine and
would place the defense attorney in the untenable position of being
the unwitting ally of the prosecution." Furthermore, the seizure of
material from the attorney's office could result in his being called as a
witness.' Both the Supreme Court and the lower courts have dis-
couraged any practice that forces an attorney to be both litigator and
witness because it impairs his effectiveness at trial.' The attorney
might even find it necessary to withdrav from the case, depriving the
client of his choice of counsel.97  Thus, the violation of the work
need for the information and a substantial equivalent cannot be obtained by other
means. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26tb){3). See
generally Comment, Discovery of Attorney's Work Product, 12 Conzaga L. Rev. 284
(1977).
91. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 49 U.S.L.W. 4093, 4097 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1931)
(No. 79-886); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947).
92. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
93. See Henry v. Perin, 609 F.2d 1010, 1012 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 963 (1980); Tarlow, supra note 6, at 17; Government Interceptions, supra note
83, at 90; cf. United States v. Colacurcio, 499 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1974)
(lawyer called to testify in grand jury loses privacy essential to defense preparation).
94. The lawyer "cannot but feel the disagreeable inconsistency of being at the
same time the solicitor and the revealer of the secrets of the cause. This double-
minded attitude would create an unhealthy moral state in the practitioner. Its con-
crete impropriety could not be overbalanced by the recollection of its abstract desira-
bility." 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 67, § 2291, at 553.
95. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 252 (1975).
96. See id. at 252-53. "Every lawyer dislikes to take the witness stand and will do
so only for grave reasons. This is partly because it is not his role, he is almost
invariably a poor witness. But he steps out of professional character to do it. He
regrets it; the profession discourages it." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 517
(1947) (Jackson, J., concurring); see In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683, 686
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
97. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943, 945-46 (E.D. Pa.
1976). The government's request to call defense counsel before the grand jury was
denied because it would "create the possibility of a conflict of interest between attor-
ney and client, which may lead to [the] suspect's being denied his choice of counsel
by disqualification." Id. The court also noted that the attorney-client relationship
would be impaired by the very presence of the attorney in the grand jury room
because it would raise doubts in the client's mind as to the attorney's devotion to the
client's interests. Id. at 946. The lawyer is professionally required to withdraw if
called on to be a witness. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 5-9, 5-10,
DR 5-102 (1976).
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product doctrine resulting from a law office search inevitably creates
conflict between lawyer and client and undercuts the adversarial ten-
sion between opposing counsel that is necessary to the effective func-
tioning of the judicial system.
A law office search hampers the defense attorney's effectiveness in
other ways. Threatened by the spectre of a search, the attorney
might feel forced to practice self-censorship or obfuscating techniques
that would hinder his ability to assist his client.99 If information
essential to trial preparation is seized by the police, the attorney may
find it difficult to secure its return " and would have to prepare his
case without the materials.
3. The Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel
The impartial balance essential to the effective functioning of the
adversary system is ensured by the constitutional rights accorded the
individual.1°' Before a state may deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property in a criminal proceeding, he must be granted the right to
counsel, trial by jury, due process, and the privilege against self-
98. See M. Freedman, supra note 67, at 2-4; cf. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S.
470, 474-77 (1973) (the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is violated If
a defendant is required to divulge the details of his own case while he is subjected to
the surprise of the prosecutor's case); United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1195
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (the defendant has a fifth amendment right to compel the state to
investigate and prove its own case; "[t]he defense has no duty to help the prosecu-
tion convict the defendant").
99. Covert methods to limit the intrusiveness of a search, such as abandoning the
practice of having a client write a complete account of an incident, using intentional
ambiguity in filing, removing and secreting essential documents, will result in incon-
venience, inefficiency, and confusion. Tarlow, supra note 6, at 17. See also Note,
Legal Ethics and the Destruction of Evidence, 88 Yale L.J. 1665 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Destruction of Evidence].
100. An individual may petition the government for return of property unlawfully
seized under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) and related state statutes. See, e.g., Cal. Penal
Code § 1538.5 (West 1970 & Supp. 1980) (property returned unless suppression
refused or further proceedings planned); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 114-12 (Smith-Hurd
1977) (procedure for motion to suppress and to return seized property); Wis. Stat.
Ann § 968.20 (West 1971 & Supp. 1980) (property returned unless required for evi-
dence or for further proceedings). Individuals have experienced great difficulty,
however, regaining possession of their seized property. When the government's in-
terest in the secrecy of an ongoing investigation outweighs the individual's temporary
loss of property, courts have denied petitions for return. United States v. Premises
Known as 608 Taylor Ave., 584 F.2d 1297, 1302-04 (3d Cir. 1978); Shea v, Gabriel,
520 F.2d 879, 880-82 (1st Cir. 1975). See generally Geltner, The Proper Disposition
of Seized Papers and Effects, 1979 Wash. U.L.Q. 833.
101. See M. Freedman, supra note 67, at 2-4. The adversary system proceeds on
the assumption "that the best way to ascertain the truth is to present to an impartial
judge or jury a confrontation between the proponents of conflicting views, assigning
to each the task of marshalling and presenting the evidence in as thorough and per-
suasive a way as possible." Id. at 4.
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incrimination. 2 Of these rights, the right to counsel is the most
important because it is essential to the assertion of all rights.I"
The sixth amendment right to counsel includes the right to confer
with one's lawyer."4 Yet, this right is ineffective "if the client knows
102. In Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), the Supreme Court held that
a search and seizure of incriminating private papers does not violate the search
target's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination because the element of com-
pulsion is absent in a search. Id. at 477. Therefore, under a literal reading of
Andresen, a client's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination is not violated
by a search of his attorney's office because the client has no fifth amendment objec-
tion to a search and seizure of his private papers. In reaching its decision that the
documents were obtained without compulsion, the Andresen Court emphasized three
factors. First, the information was obtained by the police without the defendant's
assistance. Second, the incriminating statements were voluntarily committed to pa-
per. Third, the papers were authenticated by a handwriting expert, and thus re-
quired no possessory admission by the defendant. In Andresen, therefore, the defen-
dant was not required "to say or to do anything." Id. at 473. An attorney's client is
in a different position. Having been placed in an adversarial position by the govern-
ment, the client is compelled to divulge all possibly relevant information to his attor-
ney to exercise his sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Yet,
by divulging this incriminating information, the client is subject to its use against
him following a search of his attorney's office. To retain his right against self-
incrimination, the client must sacrifice full and honest communication with his attor-
ney. The client is thus required to choose between benefits, essentially conditioning
the exercise of one constitutional right on the waiver of another. Attorney-Client
Privilege, supra note 24, at 485-86. Such forced sacrifice of constitutional rights
should not be countenanced. Comment, Search of the Lawyer's Office-Court-
Sanctioned Threat to Confidential Communications, 32 Ala. L. Rev. 92, 126 (1980).
Information unavailable by subpoena from an attorney's office because of the fifth
amendment, see Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 405 (1976); Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 337 (1973) (Brennan, J., concurring), should not become avail-
able by the use of a search warrant because the information is essentially "com-
pelled." See Search and Seizure, supra note 82, at 368-75. See generally McKenna,
supra note 40; 26 DePaul L. Rev. 848 (1977).
103. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 481 (1966) ('the attorney plays a vital role
in the administration of criminal justice under our Constitution"); Clark, Fulfilling
the Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 19 Washburn L.J. 395, 395 (1980)
(sixth amendment right to counsel is essential to the assertion of all constitutional
rights). The sixth amendment right to counsel and the fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination provide a constitutional basis for the attorney-client privilege.
Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 24, at 485-86.
104. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 88-89 (1976); see Gideon v. %Vain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-44 (1963) (right to court appointed counsel); Reynolds v.
Cochran, 365 U.S. 525, 530-31 (1961) (reasonable opportunity for consultation and
preparation); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) (reasonable time to prepare
defense); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (reasonable time to secure coun-
sel). The right to counsel attaches when the proceeding is at a critical stage of the
entire criminal process against the defendant, and after formal adversary proceedings
against the accused have commenced. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 6S9-90 (1972).
The rule set out in Kirby is accepted in most jurisdictions. In New York, however,
the right to counsel attaches when counsel is actually retained, or when the suspect
requests counsel. See People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 205, 400 N.E.2d 360,
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that damaging information could be more readily obtained from the
attorney following disclosure than from himself in the absence of
disclosure." 15 Therefore, "the essence of the Sixth Amendment
right is .. .privacy of communication with counsel."'
The Supreme Court acknowledged, in Weatherford v. Bursey, 1'1
that the sixth amendment would be violated if the government pur-
posefully intrudes on the defense camp and receives privileged in-
formation pertaining to the defense strategy because of the "chilling
effect" that inheres if the client knows that his communications with
his attorney are available to the government, his adversary in the
criminal proceeding."8 Purposeful intrusion is most evident in in-
stances of wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping." In three de-
cisions, the Court ordered a new trial for the defendant because the
government had electronically monitored attorney-client
conversations."1 Even though the police had not given the informa-
tion to the prosecutor's office in one case, the Court still held that
the case had been prejudiced by the police action."'
361, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 422 (1980); People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 481, 348
N.E.2d 894, 896, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 420 (1976); 1 W. Ringel, supra note 11, § 31.3
to 31.4(a)(1), at 31-4 to 31-21. Because the meaningful implementation of the sixth
amendment right to counsel depends on the privacy of attorney-client communica-
tions, the client's sixth amendment right attaches when his attorney's office is
searched. See Brief of Minn. State Bar Ass'n As Amicus Curiae at 12-13, O'Connor v,
Johnson, - Minn. -, 287 N.W.2d 400 (1979) (en bane).
105. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); see Weatherford v.
Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 n.4 (1977) (government interception of attorney-client
communications inhibits free exchange and is a threat to the effective assistance of
counsel).
106. United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1224 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 950 (1974); see Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 564 (1977) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 1978); Baird v.
Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1960); In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683,
685 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); People v. Belge, 83 Misc. 2d 186, 189-91, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798,
801 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 50 A.D.2d 1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (4th Dep't 1975), aff'd, 41
N.Y.2d 60, 359 N.E.2d 377, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976). See also M. Freedman, supra
note 79, at 4-8.
107. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
108. Id. at 554 n.4.
109. Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d 879, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Coplon v.
United States, 191 F.2d 749, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926
(1952). See generally Government Interceptions, supra note 83; 27 DePaul L. Rev.
203 (1977).
110. O'Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345 (1967) (per curiam); Schipani v.
United States, 385 U.S. 372 (1966) (per curiam); Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26
(1966) (per curiam).
111. O'Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345, 346 (1967) (per curiam). But see
Hoffa v. United States. 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (the attorney-client relationship had not
been violated because the government informer had never overheard any attorney-
client conversations).
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Because compliance with a search warrant is compelled, the magni-
tude of the purposeful intrusion is as great as if the government sur-
reptitiously planted monitoring devices. When the police search an
attorney's office and examine his client's confidential files, the govern-
ment is purposefully invading the defense camp, and will see priv-
ileged information pertaining to the defense strategy." 2  The devas-
tating pragmatic effect of the search is heightened when the target is
a criminal law office because, by definition, criminal defense involves
litigation in which the government is the adversary. Discover)' of con-
fidential information during the search of a criminal defense attor-
ney's office results in immediate disclosure to an agent of the adverse
party. Prejudice, therefore, is inherent in a law office search because
of the "subtle benefits" that accrue to the government through the
knowledge of defense strategy and the defendant's state of mind re-
garding the trial.13 Such knowledge will help the government agents
in structuring their answers to the affirmative defense they
anticipate."' Moreover, affirmative evidence, or leads to evidence,
will be revealed to the police."' Such purposeful intrusion taints the
entire trial process and produces effects that cannot be isolated and
remedied. "
C. Application of the Zurcher Balance
The majority in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily posited a situation that
the Supreme Court has yet to define explicitly, a search that is un-
112. Henry v. Perrin, 609 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1979). cert. denied, 445 U.S. 963
(1980). In Henry, the court noted that the average attorney's files contain names of
witnesses, statements by witnesses, correspondence between client and attorney, the
lawyer's notes of conversations with the client, lists of things to investigate of both a
factual and legal nature, photographs and sketches. It concluded that a review of any
of the file's contents would reveal defense strategy. Id. at 1012; see O'Connor v.
Johnson, - Minn. ., 287 N.W.2d 400, 404-05 (1979) (en bane).
113. Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d 558, 570 (1st Cir. 1968). aff'd, 394
U.S. 316 (1969).
114. United States v. Orman, 417 F. Supp. 1126, 1136 (D. Colo. 1976).
115. See Henry v. Perrin, 609 F.2d 1010, 1012-14 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 963 (1980); Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d 558, 570 (1st Cir. 196S),
aff'd, 394 U.S. 316 (1969).
116. United States v. Rispo, 460 F.2d 965, 974 (3d Cir. 1972). In Henry v. Per-
rin, 609 F.2d 1010 (Ist Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 963 (1980). an attorney's
files were searched pursuant to penal security policy as he left the prison in which
his client was being held. This search violated the client's sixth amendment right to
counsel because the mere exposure of the attorney's files prejudiced the case. Id. at
1013-14. " 'The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and abso-
lute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice
arising from its denial.' " Id. at 1013 (quoting Glasser v. United States. 315 U.S. 60.
76 (1942)). Similarly, in O'Connor v. Johnson, - Minn. - 287 N.V.2d 400 (1979)
(en bane), the court held that the mere exposure of confidential files to the police
violated the sixth amendment. Id. at 405.
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reasonable despite the existence of probable cause." 7 By applying
the balancing test delineated in Zurcher, 118 the search of a nonsus-
pect attorney's office appears to be such an inherently unreasonable
search. Therefore, because reasonableness, along with probable cause
and specificity, is a consideration for the magistrate issuing the search
warrant, a warrant should only be available when society's interest in
law enforcement outweighs the adverse impact of the search on the
attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, and the client's
sixth amendment rights.
To assess the impact of a law office search on the attorney-client
relationship, the effects of the search must be considered in light of
the criteria established by Justice Powell in Zurcher. First, although
the evidence sought may be unprivileged, to find it the police will
inevitably view privileged materials. Moreover, the information
sought may in fact be privileged."9 The preliminary determination of
its status should be made by a court, not by the police in the law
office. 1w
Second, the premises searched are an attorney's office. Conse-
quently, the search will be disruptive of valuable working time. "I It
will also infringe on the privileges and rights of the attorney's other
clients. i1
Third, the search will jeopardize the interests and position of both
the attorney and the client. The "chilling effect" of the search on
attorney-client communications and the exposure to the police of his
work product materials will surely affect the attorney's ability as an
advocate.'2 Furthermore, the search may injure the attorney's pro-
fessional reputation." 4 The attorney is faced with a dilemma of
117. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559-60 (1978).
118. See notes 49-63 supra and accompanying text.
119. See O'Connor v. Johnson, - Minn. -, 287 N.W.2d 400, 404-05 (1979) (en
banc); Search and Seizure, supra note 82, at 378-81.
120. See, e.g., Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 354-55 (1959) (in camera
inspection ordered to determine status of evidence held by government); In re Fish
& Neave, 519 F.2d 116, 118 (8th Cir. 1975) (in camera inspection ordered for sub-
poenaed material); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F.
Supp. 863, 868 (D. Minn. 1979) (in camera inspection ordered for seized materials),
aff'd as qualified, 629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980).
121. See Search and Seizure, supra note 82, at 384. The law office search in
Deukmejian v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 253, 162 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1980), is
illustrative of the disruption and inconvenience a search can cause. See notes 1-8
supra and accompanying text; cf. Zurcher v. Stanfbrd Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 571
(1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (disruption of newsroom caused by search),
122. See notes 79-82 supra and accompanying text.
123. See notes 83-84, 93-100, 113-16 supra and accompanying text.
124. Search and Seizure, supra note 82, at 385; see Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
U.S. at 580 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (third party search may result in unjusti-
fied injury to reputation of person searched).
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whether to honor his ethical obligation to his client by resisting the
search and risking contempt charges, or allowing the search to pro-
ceed, thereby exposing his confidential files and possibly violating a
state statute requiring that he assiduously protect the information
conveyed to him in confidence by his clients. m
The client's interests are adversely affected because he will not re-
ceive effective assistance from his attorney and because the police
will have access to information that is normally unavailable.1 6
Moreover, the client's interests are not protected by the traditional
post-search remedies. Neither the client nor the attorney have stand-
ing to invoke the exclusionary rule '-7 to suppress unprivileged mate-
rial that is seized illegally because the Supreme Court has consist-
ently rejected third party standing.1" Even if standing is given to the
125. The Code of Ethics requires the attorney to "hold inviolate the confidences
and secrets of his client." ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 4-1, DR
4-101(A), (B)(1). In California the attorney is also required "to maintain inviolate the
confidence, and at every peril to himself to preserve the secrets of his client." Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e) (West 1974); accord, Miss. Code Ann. § 73-3-37(4)
(1973); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-105(4) (1977); Or. Rev. Stat. § 9.460(5) (1979). An attor-
ney in California who resisted the search of confidential files pursuant to a %%arrant
was convicted of battery. Tarlow, supra note 6, at 18; see Spencer, Zurcher v. Stan-
ford Daily: A Fishing License For Lawyer's Files?, 36 J. Mo. B. 158, 161 (1980)
(Oregon attorney faced with the choice of resisting warrant or violating Oregon's
statute on attorney-client privilege); Miller & Mortenson, Non-Whistle-blowing
Lawyers Risk Criminal Charges, Legal Times Wash., Mar. 10, 1980, at 14, col. 1
(attorney indicted as co-conspirator for not revealing to the prosecution client's mis-
statement of facts).
126. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
127. The exclusidnary rule is the primary means of giving effect to the guarantees
of the fourth amendment. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1914). The rationale of the rule is that police
will not engage in illegal searches if the product of such searches is inadmissable in
court. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). See generally Kuhns, The
Concept of Personal Aggrievement in Fourth Amendment Standing Cases, 65 Iowa L.
Rev. 493, 499-501 (1980). The Court has severely criticized the exclusionary rule.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 137; Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 485; United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 538 (1975); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
U.S. 388, 415 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128,
136 (1954).
128. Both the client and the attorney will have standing to suppress privileged
material. In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 863,
868 (D. Minn. 1979), affd as qualified, 629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980). Neither may
be granted standing, however, to suppress unprivileged material. A nonsuspect attor-
ney whose office is searched may not have standing because "a person whose Fourth
Amendment rights were violated by a search or seizure, but who is not a defendant
in a criminal action . . . would not have standing." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
132 n.2 (1978). The client who is the target of the search might not have standing
because "[a] person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through
the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's prem-
ises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed." Id. at
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parties to suppress privileged material," suppression will not serve to
mitigate the "chilling effect" of the search. The prosecution may still
prepare responses to defense strategies through their illegally
obtained knowledge.' 30 Additionally, if the material is suppressed
and the charges dropped, these same documents could be used in a
civil action against the client.31' Finally, the client will probably not
be able to obtain redress through a civil action against the police
officers 132 who conducted the search because the officers can defeat
the action by claiming that they acted with a good faith belief that
their actions were legal. '3
134; see Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 562 n.9 (1978); Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-74 (1969). But see People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d
755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955) (California allows third party standing). See generally
Kuhns, supra note 127, at 530-39. The attorney and the client, however, both have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the information in the attorney's files, see note 33
supra, and therefore should have standing to suppress illegally seized evidence. See
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 (1978); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364,
368-69 (1968). The Supreme Court has never expressly addressed the issue of the
client's standing to contest a law office search. Dissenting from the Court's denial of
certiorari in Granello v. United States, 386 U.S. 1019 (1967), Justice Douglas,
however, recognized that attorneys and clients should have standing. In Granello, a
lawyer's documents were seized in an allegedly illegal search of his premises and
introduced against an alleged client in a criminal prosecution. 365 F.2d 990, 995-97
(2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1019 (1967). Justice Douglas wrote that "I
cannot . . . believe that if a lawyer-client relation is shown and if the search were
held to be illegal, the client is without standing to move for suppression of the
evidence. The dimensions of the problem are so great, in the setting of the Fourth
Amendment and our enveloping regime of police surveillance .... " 386 U.S. at
1019 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see United States v. Sander, 615 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 108 (1980).
129. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 801-02 (3d Cir.
1979); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 868
(D. Minn. 1979), aff'd as qualified, 629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980).
130. See notes 113-16 supra and accompanying text.
131. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976). In Janis, federal officials used
documents illegally seized by state officials to calculate Janis' tax liability and levied
on illegally seized funds as a partial payment of taxes (lue. Id. at 437-38. The Su-
preme Court upheld the action because the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary
rule were achieved by prohibiting state's use of the evidence. Id. at 454-60,
132. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (state governor not immune from
civil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (federal agents civilly liable for unlawful searches under theory of
constitutional tort).
133. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-58 (1967); Schoneberger v. Hincheliffe, 28
Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2098, 2099 (D. Vt. Sept. 19, 1980); Pritz v. Hackett, 440 F.
Supp. 592, 597-99 (W.D. Wis. 1977); see United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531
(1975). In Peltier, the Court refused to suppress evidence seized in good faith be-
cause judicial integrity is "not offended if law enforcement officials reasonably be-
lieved in good faith that their conduct was in accordance with the law even if
[subsequent] decisions . . . have held that conduct . . is not permitted by the
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By Justice Powell's fourth criterion, the magnitude of the search, a
law office search is unreasonable because it unavoidably results in the
exposure of privileged materials. 3' This intrusiveness cannot be
cured by the particularity of the warrant because the police will have
to search every file and examine every document to see if it is the
evidence sought."n Such a search is akin to the exploratory general
search that the fourth amendment was originally designed to
prevent."
It is insufficient to argue that a brief perusal of the files by the
police is harmless error. A review of the file jacket may reveal the
client's identity, which may be confidential information protected by
the attorney-client privilege.' 7 To the extent that a file reflects
orderly, professional preparation, the mental processes of the attor-
ney may be revealed by a review of the file's captions, index, and
location in the file catalog, thereby violating the work product
Constitution." Id. at 538. See generally Bell, Civil Liability For Illegal Searches and
Seizures, 5 Search & Seizure L. Rep., Sept. 1978, at 1. Furthermore, the defense
attorney may be hesitant to bring a civil action against the police officers in his area
for fear that he may alienate them. Amsterdam, supra note 38, at 430.
134. O'Connor v. Johnson, - Minn. -, 287 N.W.2d 400, 404405 (1979) (en
bane).
135. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 573 n.7 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissen-
ting); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976); O'Connor v. Johnson,
- Minn. - 287 N.W.2d 400, 404-05 (1979) (en bane).
136. General warrants are prohibited by the fourth amendment. "[Tihe problem
[posed by the general warrant] is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general,
exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S 443, 467 (1971); accord, Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965); see Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967); T. Taylor, supra note 41, at 67-68. The Sup-
reme Court has held that "a search which is reasonable at its inception may violate
the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope." Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 (1968). When the warrant requirement could not mitigate the
intrusiveness of the search and constitutional rights were infringed, courts have de-
clared the search to be unreasonable. Henry v. Perrin, 609 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1979)
(search of attorney's files declared an unreasonable search), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
963 (1980); United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. 1949) (stomach pump-
ing constitutes unreasonable search); Adams v. State, 260 Ind. 663, 299 N.E.2d 834
(1973) (a court-ordered surgical operation to remove a bullet from a suspect's body
declared unconstitutional as an unreasonable search and seizure), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 935 (1974); O'Connor v. Johnson, - Minn. - 287 N.W.2d 400 (1979) (en
banc) (search of attorney's office declared unreasonable search); cf. Rochin v. Califor-
nia, 342 U.S. 165, 169, 172 (1952) (unreasonable search of a body by use of a stom-
ach pump violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
137. See, e.g., Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663, 664-65 (7th Cir. 1965) (attor-
ney gave IRS anonymous check for additional taxes and client's identity privileged);
Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 633 (9th Cir. 1960) (same); In re Kaplan, 8 N.Y.2d
214, 218-20, 168 N.E.2d 660, 661-62, 203 N.Y.S.2d 836, 838-39 (1960) (attorney
conveyed anonymous information to the police, and client's identity privileged).
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doctrine.'- Even though the officers may intend to observe the priv-
ileges scrupulously, their review of the material constitutes a seizure
by sight and irreparably damages the vitality of the attorney-client
privilege and the work-product doctrine.
The constitutional interests affected, Justice Powell's fifth criterion,
are the client's and the attorney's fourth amendment right to
privacy "I and the client's sixth amendment right to the effective
assistance of counsel. "' Both these constitutional rights are violated
by a law office search. Thus, by Justice Powell's five criteria the
search of a nonsuspect attorney's law office severely damages the in-
dividual's interests in privacy. To complete the balancing process,
however, the state's interest in law enforcement must be
considered. "'
Prosecutors are concerned that law offices will become "depositor-
ies of criminal evidence, private sanctuaries beyond the reach of law
and justice." 142 Their concerns, however, are without foundation.
Although an attorney may have a court quash a subpoena for priv-
ileged materials by invoking the attorney-client privilege and the
138. See Henry v. Perrin, 609 F.2d 1010, 1012 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 963 (1980). Even a cursory glance at the file can disclose an entire theory of
defense if the file is labelled "Alibi Defense" or "Entrapment Defense." Tarlow,
supra note 6, at 17.
139. O'Connor v. Johnson, - Minn. -, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (1979) (en bane);
see notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text. "[C]oercive governmental procurement
of evidence integrally related to fundamental personal rights or testimonial evidence
in which the accused has a privacy interest, but which is not in his possession,
should be considered a per se violation of the fourth amendment's reasonableness
clause." Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy
Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 Harv. L, Rev. 945, 990 (1977).
140. O'Connor v. Johnson, - Minn. -, 287 N.W.2d 400, 404-05 (1979) (en banc);
see notes 103-16 supra and accompanying text. The sixth amendment right to counsel
is violated if the assistance rendered is inadequate. Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 76 (1942). The definition of adequacy of counsel is subject to varying inter-
pretations. See W. Ringel, supra note 11, § 68, at 93-100 (1978 Supp.). Defense
counsel, to satisfy the adequacy standard, must perform three essential duties: con-
sult fully and immediately with the client to discuss all relevant matters; advise the
client regarding his rights, including all actions necessary to preserve them; and con-
duct a sufficient investigation of the facts and law to insure that all available defenses
are raised. Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849
(1968). These standards follow closely those established by the A.B.A. in its Stan-
dards for the Defense Function. W. Ringel, supra note 11, § 68, at 94 (1978 Supp.);
see Erickson, Standards of Competency for Defense Counsel in a Criminal Case, 17
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 233 (1979). If a defense attorney realistically fears that the con-
tents of his files are subject to discovery by the police, the attorney would find
himself limiting the amount of incriminating information, he elicits from his client or
collects about the case. Such necessary self-censorship would render nugatory the
client's sixth amendment right. See Cowger, Will Lawyers Be Giving Stanford
Warnings?, 64 A.B.A.J. 1211 (1978).
141. See notes 50-51, 58-63 supra and accompanying text.
142. Search warrant fever spreads to Calif. firms, 65 A.B.A.J. 886, 886 (1979)
(quoting California Attorney General George Deukmejian). Law enforcement officers
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work product doctrine,"4 most of the information the prosecutor legit-
imately needs is unprivileged and thus available by subpoena.'" The
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine do not apply
to pre-existing documents,"' 5 to evidence, 16 to non-legal
communications,' 47 to non-confidential communications,14 to corn-
have responded unfavorably to a subpoena-first rule. According to a survey, 92% of
the United States attorneys responding opposed legislative schemes limiting third
party searches. Erburu, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily: The Legislative Debate, 17 Harv.
J. Legis. 152, 163-65 & n.59 (1980); see O'Neill, Effective Law Enforcement, in Sear-
ching A Delicate Balance, L.A. Law., Oct. 1979, at 43-50 (comments of a Calif.
deputy attorney general on a subpoena first requirement).
143. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403-05 (1976) (attorney may invoke
attorney-client privilege to quash a subpoena); Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner
Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1967) (attorney is duty-bound to assert privilege to
protect confidential communications).
144. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403-05 (1976); O'Connor v. John-
son, - Minn. - 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (1979) (en banc). An attorney must deliver
subpoenaed material or he will be held in contempt of court. Chapman v. Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co., 613 F.2d 193, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1979) (attorney held in contempt for
refusal to produce written narrative statement of testimony ordered by judge); see
United States v. Askew, 584 F.2d 960, 962 (10th Cir. 1978) (defendant held in civil
contempt for failure to produce handwriting exemplars ordered by court), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operat-
ing Eng'rs, 552 F.2d 498, 509-12 (3d Cir.) (attorney who refused court order held in
contempt; no defense that attorney believed actions to be in client's best interests),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977).
145. Material that could be subpoenaed from the client if it were in the client's
possession does not become privileged because of a transfer to an attorney. The fifth
amendment only applies "when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial com-
munication that is incriminating." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976).
Pre-existing documents that are nontestimonial can be subpoenaed from an attorney.
Id. at 403-04; In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Johanson), 27 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA)
2507, 2508 (3d Cir. August 21, 1980); In re Grand Jury Empanelled Feb. 14, 1978
(Markowitz), 603 F.2d 469, 476-77 (3d Cir. 1979); C. McCormick, supra note 72,
§ 89, at 185.
146. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 245 n.4 (1975); Jencks v. United
States, 353 U.S. 657, 670 (1957); In re Grand Jury (Censon), 534 F.2d 719, 728 (7th
Cir. 1976); Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200, 1210-11 (Alaska 1978); see Comment,
The Right of a Criminal Defense Attorney to Withhold Physical Evidence Received
from His Client, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 211 (1970).
147. The privileges do not apply when the attorney acts as a "mere scrivener." C.
McCormick, supra note 72, § 88, at 180. The privileges generally do not apply to
objectively observable information such as the client's identity, Gannet v. First Nat'l
State Bank, 410 F. Supp. 585, 588 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 546 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977), or the client's demeanor. United States v. Ken-
drick, 331 F.2d 110, 114 (4th Cir. 1964).
148. See In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir.) (disclosure to third person
vitiates privilege), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973); United States v. IBM, 66
F.R.D. 206, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (an exhaustive list of documents ruled not priv-
ileged because they did not reveal confidences communicated by the client). Once
waived, the privilege cannot be reinstated. In re Penn Central Comm'l Paper Litiga-
tion, 61 F.R.D. 453, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); see, e.g., Diversified Indust. Inc. v.
Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (when the client is a corpora-
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munications regarding a pre-existing fiduciary obligation,",9 or to com-
munications in furtherance of a crime, fraud, or tort.' Moreover,
the privileges are not "self-operative" because the court must have an
opportunity to make an inspection of any allegedly privileged
documents."' "[T]he individual citizen may not resolve himself into
a court, and himself determine [a question of privilege as to] the
contents of ... papers required to be produced."1' Therefore, the
prosecutor can expect an impartial resolution of his request for mate-
rial in an attorney's custody.
Attorneys have a strong incentive to cooperate with the prosecu-
tor's request for information. An attorney is required by law to give
evidence to the prosecution and is subject to criminal charges and
disbarment if the information is withheld.1 m  Attorneys are further
restricted in their activities by the Canons of Ethics." Moreover,
tion, it must provide information about its own internal security to establish a claim
of confidentiality for records held by corporate counsel); Prudhomme v. Superior
Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 327 n.10, 466 P.2d 673, 678 n.10. 85 Cal. Rptr. 129, 134 n.10
(1970) (client cannot invoke the attorney-client privilege for information he intends to
disclose voluntarily at trial).
149. The attorney-client privilege is inapplicable when an attorney represents joint
clients, one of whom owes a fiduciary obligation to the other. Garner v. Wolfinbar-
ger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1102-03 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971);
Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361, 368 (D. Del. 1975).
150. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
Involving Berkley & Co., 629 F.2d 548, 552-55 (8th Cir. 1980); In re Special
September 1978 Grand Jury (II), No. 79-1218, slip op. at 17 (7th Cir. April 30,
1980); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 337 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Calvert,
523 F.2d 895, 909 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1976); United States v.
Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006, 1011 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974);
Webb v. State, 580 P.2d 295, 301 (Alaska 1978); C. McCormick, supra note 72, § 95,
at 199. The burden is on the government to make a "prima facie" case that the
attorney was retained to promote criminal or fraudulent activity. In re Grand Jury
Proceeding (Lawson), 600 F.2d 215, 218-19 (9th Cir. 1979).
151. See note 120 supra.
152. United States v. Grand Jury Investigation, 401 F. Supp. 361, 367 (W.D. Pa.
1975); accord, In re Fish & Neave, 519 F.2d 116, 118 (8th Cir. 1975).
153. E.g., In re Ryder, 381 F.2d 713, 714 (4th Cir. 1967) (per curiam) (attorney
who took possession of gun and stolen money found guilty of unprofessional conduct);
Webb v. State, 580 P.2d 295, 302-04 (Alaska 1978) (attorney convicted of being an
accessory after the fact for withholding information about his client charged with first
degree murder); People v. Lee, 3 Cal. App. 3d 514, 526, 83 Cal. Rptr. 715, 722
(1970) (attorney must turn evidence over to the authorities). But see People v. Beige,
83 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct.) (client charged with murder told attor-
ney the location of the bodies, information held to be privileged), aff'd, 50 A.D,2d
1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (4th Dept. 1975), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 359 N.E.2d 377, 390
N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976). See generally Destruction of Evidence, supra note 99.
154. See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-102(A) (1976) ("a lawyer
shall not .... [c]onceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by
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pursuant to the oath at bar, attorneys are officers of the court, re-
quired to preserve and protect the judicial processes.,
Society's interest in law enforcement is therefore adequately pro-
tected by the use of a subpoena for information in a nonsuspect attor-
ney's custody. The hazards to criminal investigation perceived by the
Zurcher Court' are not threatened by the advance notice and delay
a subpoena entails when an attorney is the recipient."z Moreover, it
is in society's interest to rely on the least intrusive means for securing
evidence from an attorney because "[i]f our adversary system is to
function according to design, we must assume that an attorney wvill
observe his responsibilities to the legal system, as well as to his
client. " ,s
The purpose of requiring special procedures when evidence is
sought from nonsuspect attorneys is not to give them the ultimate
option of preventing the government from obtaining the material.
There is no doubt that certain material lawvfully in an attorney's pos-
session should be made available to the police. Rather, the protec-
tions are desirable to ensure that the material is obtained in the least
intrusive manner possible, consistent with society's interests in effec-
tive law enforcement. The Supreme Court has reiterated, in Upjohn
Co. v. United States,'59 that the attorney-client privilege is premised
on the recognition that "sound legal advice or advocacy serves public
ends and that such advice . . . depends upon the lawyer being full),
informed by the client." 160 For this full disclosure to be achieved,
"the attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of
certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncer-
tain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in
widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no pri-
vilege at all.'" ,6 Thus, unless some absolute standards are estab-
lished to protect the attorney-client relationship from law office
searches, the benefits that accrue to the judicial system through the
attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, and the sixth
amendment right to counsel, will be lost.
law to reveal .... [or] [c]ounsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows
to be illegal or fraudulent").
155. O'Connor v. Johnson, - Minn. - 287 N.W.2d 400 (1979) (en bane).
156. See notes 59-62 supra and accompanying text.
157. Unlike a newsroom, an attorney's office does contain files of confidential in-
formation that are protected from disclosure by law. The majority in Zurchcr re-jected special fourth amendment protection of third parties because of the difficulty
with identifying suspects in the early stages of a criminal investigation. 436 U.S. at
560 (1978). Yet, attorneys are a highly identifiable class and possess potential evi-
dence solely because of the nature of their work. 1977 Tern, supra note 63 at 206.
158. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 93 (1976) (Marshall. J., concurring).
159. 49 U.S.L.W. 4093 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1981) (No. 79-886).
160. Id. at 4094.
161. Id. at 4095.
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II. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO LAW OFFICE SEARCHES
In response to the need to give law offices greater protection, leg-
islation has been promulgated in California,1" and on a federal level,
by the Justice Department. 16 These legislative efforts provide in-
sufficient protection, however, because as worded they allow a very
expansive interpretation of the government's right to secure a search
warrant. This could result in the unfettered searching of nonsuspect
attorney's offices. Although a search warrant is undoubtedly the more
convenient means for the police to gain information from a law office,
considerations of convenience cannot overcome the policies served by
the protections accorded the attorney-client relationship.
14
Because the requirement of reasonableness compels the magistrate
to invalidate the search of a nonsuspect attorney's office, the goal of
legislators must be to establish a procedure that will enable the pros-
ecutor to obtain the information he needs, while ensuring that inno-
cent people are protected from unnecessarily intrusive searches. Such
a procedure should clearly indicate when law enforcement interests
override the policies protecting the attorney-client relationship. The
search of a law firm, properly limited, would then be reasonable. For
example, the use of a search warrant would be appropriate when
there is probable cause to believe that the attorney is a criminal sus-
pect, or that the information would be destroyed if advance notice of
the prosecution's interest is given to the attorney.
A. The Justice Department Guidelines
The Justice Department guidelines, promulgated pursuant to the
Privacy Protection Act of 1980," apply to all nonsuspect third par-
ties, and especially to those with professional, confidential rela-
tionships. As originally conceived by many legislators, the Privacy
Protection Act limited the use of search warrants against all nonsus-
pect third parties, including attorneys."' The Act as passed, how-
ever, protects only those people involved in some "form of public
communication." 16 The Act, based on the commerce clause, reflects
that first amendment values "are fundamental to the work of people
who disseminate information in interstate or foreign commerce."
162. Cal. Penal Code § 1524 (West Supp. 1980).
163. 46 Fed. Reg. 1302 (1981) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 59).
164. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 49 U.S.L.W. 4093, 4096 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1981)
(No. 79-886).
165. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 1882.
166. Bayh, supra note 34, at 7; Erburu, supra note 42, at 161-73; 10 N.M. L.
Rev. 443, 454-57 (1980).
167. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, § 101(a), 94 Stat. 1879.
168. Erburu, supra note 142, at 189. Most of the bills proposed in Congress were
based on the enabling clause of the fourteenth amendment. U.S. Const. amend.
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Because lawyers and other nonsuspect search targets have a more
tenuous effect on interstate commerce and generally do not hold
documents for interstate public dissemination, it would have
stretched the meaning and scope of the commerce clause to "absurd-
ity" to extend the Act's protection beyond media search targets.""
Attorneys are, therefore, protected only by the provisions of the Jus-
tice Department Guidelines, which recommend that a search warrant
"not be used" to secure documentary evidence 1 0 in an attorney's cus-
tody. This requirement has considerably less impact than that of the
Privacy Protection Act, which states that "it shall be unlawful" to use
a search warrant for media search targets.17'
The Guidelines sanction the search of a law office if the attorney is
"reasonably believed" to be a suspect in the crime under
investigation, or if he is related by blood or marriage to the sus-
pected client whose files are sought.173 The standard established-
reason to believe-is less protective of the rights and interests at
stake in a search than a standard of probable cause. Although the
police must initially establish probable cause as to the client's crimi-
nal involvement, to search his attorney's office the police need only
XIV, § 5. The Justice Department proposal, which is the bill that passed, is the only
bill based on the commerce clause. The constitutional use of the commerce clause to
support this legislation is open to question. Generally, the Court has required that
the activity regulated under such authority have a close and substantial relationship
with, or effect on, commerce. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 30-2
(1964) (restaurant serving food shipped in interstate commerce subject to federal reg-
ulation); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964)
(operation of motel affects interstate commerce and is subject to federal regulation);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (agricultural production for home use
affects interstate commerce and is subject to federal regulation). Public communica-
tions arguably lack such a close and substantial relationship with commerce. More-
over, the legislation is possibly unconstitutional as a violation of the tenth amend-
ment pursuant to the Court's decision in National League of Cities v. Usury, 426
U.S. 833 (1976). See Erburu, supra note 159, at 190-92; Note, The Constitutionality
of Congressional Legislation to Overrule Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 71 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 147, 152 (1980).
169. Erburu, supra note 142 at 191, see Congress Could Stretch Warrant Bill
Protections, 65 A.B.A.J. 1030 (1979).
170. 46 Fed. Reg. 1302, 1303 (1981) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 59.4(b)(1)). The
provisions of both the Act and the Guidelines seek to incorporate the constitutional
doctrine of "less drastic means," which allows a governmental practice that impairs
constitutional rights to be successfully challenged because existing alternatives could
accomplish essentially the same goal without intrusion on the threatened values.
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-93 (1960). The doctrine has been applied pre-
dominately in the first amendment area. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267-
68 (1967); NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307-08 (1964). It was applied in a
fourth amendment case in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662-63 (1979).
171. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, § 101(a), (b), 94 Stat.
1879-80.
172. 46 Fed. Reg. 1302, 1303 (1981) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 59.2(c)(1)).
173. Id. at 1303 (1981) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 59.2(c)(2)).
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establish that they reasonably believe that the attorney is involved as
well. Conversely, the Privacy Protection Act requires that probable
cause of the media search target's criminal involvement be estab-
lished before a search warrant will issue. 174
A search warrant could also issue under the Guidelines if "[ilt
appears that the use of a subpoena, summons, request, or other less
intrusive alternative means ...would substantially jeopardize the
availability or usefulness of the materials sought." ' The standard
established-"it appears"--is again considerably less protective than
the Privacy Protection Act's standard of "reason to believe" that the
notice and delay afforded by a subpoena would result in the destruc-
tion, alteration, or concealment of the material sought. 16 Moreover,
the language of the Guidelines is subject to a very expansive in-
terpretation by prosecutors who want to secure law office search
warrants. The phrase, "substantially jeopardize the availability," is
defined in the Guidelines to mean creating a risk of "destruction,
alteration, concealment, or transfer of the material sought." "7 This
standard is essentially equivalent to the terminology of the Privacy
Protection Act.'78 The alternative justification for using a search war-
rant, substantial jeopardy to the "usefulness of the materials sought,"
is defined by the Guidelines to mean "detrimentally delaying the in-
vestigation, destroying a chain of custody, etc." 19 This loosely
worded standard would allow a prosecutor to justify the use of a
search warrant for an attorney's offices by alleging that using a sub-
poena will result in a burdensome delay. The potential for misuse of
this expansive exception is enormous.
Finally, a search warrant is available for a law office if "[a]ccess to
the documentary materials appears to be of substantial importance to
the investigation or prosecution for which they are sought." "I A pro-
secutor can manipulate this last exception to secure a search warrant
in virtually every case because all evidence is potentially of substan-
tial importance. Thus, attorneys are virtually without protection.
The only purported safeguard provided by the Guidelines is in the
application procedure for a warrant, which requires that a warrant
174. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, § 101(a)(1), (b)(1), 94
Stat. 1879-80. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 968.13 (West Supp. 1979-80) (documentary evi-
dence only available if probable cause is shown that custodian is reasonably sus-
pected to be criminally involved).
175. 46 Fed. Reg. 1302, 1303 (1981) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 59.4(b)(i)).
176. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, § 101(b)(3), 94 Stat. 1880.
177. 46 Fed. Reg. 1302, 1304 (1981) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 59.4 (c)(1)).
178. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, § 101(b)(3), 94 Stat.
1882.
179. 46 Fed. Reg. 1302, 1303 (1981) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 59.1(b)) (emph-
asis added).
180. Id. at 1303 (1981) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 59.4(b)(1)(ii)).
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application be authorized by the Attorney General or his designee."'
Once again, however, the exception vitiates the protection of the
rule. A search may be made without such authorization if "the im-
mediacy of the need to seize the materials does not permit an oppor-
tunity to secure the authorization."" The immediacy of the govern-
ment's need to obtain the materials may be established when the
seizure is necessary to prevent injury to persons or property or to
preserve the material's evidentiary value, or when the "delay in
obtaining the materials would significantly jeopardize an ongoing in-
vestigation or prosecution." " The immediacy of the government's
need is subject to the same vagaries of interpretation as the excep-
tions for securing a search warrant.
The effectiveness of the Guidelines will depend largely on the in-
terpretation given them by the magistrates issuing warrants. Many
commentators suggest that it is unrealistic to assume that a magistrate
will give less than the broadest possible interpretation to a warrant
request. 8 4 The magistrate often has developed a symbiotic rela-
tionship with the police after years of working together." As magis-
trates are often not lawyers, they may not be able to consider ade-
quately the constitutional issues involved in a search.'" For these
reasons, it is essential that the standards of protection for a law office
be clearly defined and strictly maintained.
A final problem with the proposed Guidelines is the scheme of
sanctions provided for enforcement. The Privacy Protection Act pro-
181. 46 Fed. Reg. 1302, 1303-04 (1981) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 59.4(b)(2)).
182. Id. at 1304 (1981) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 59.4(b)(2)(i)).
183. Id. at 1304 (1981) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 59.4(c)(2)(i)(ii)(iii)).
184. See Erburu, supra note 142, at 174-75 ("[m]agistrates have a virtual identity
of interests with law enforcement"); Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance By Leare of the
Magistrate: The Case in Opposition, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 169, 190-91 (1969) C"i]t is
notoriously easy for prosecutors to obtain search warrants"); Weinreb, supra note 33,
at 71-72 (the inadequacy of magistrates taints the entire procedure for obtaining a
warrant); 12 Creighton L. Rev. 881, 892-93 (1979) ("[i]n a warrant hearing there is no
adversarial input or argument .... [s]uch a procedure lends itself to the presenta-
tion of evidence which only supports the issuance of a warrant.
185. 10 N.M.L. Rev. 443, 454 (1980).
186. Id. Moreover, a magistrate can issue a wvarrant that allows a very extensive
search of a law office. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). In Andresen, an
attorney's office was searched because the attorney was suspected of criminal activity.
The Court did not discuss the ramifications of the search for the attorney's clients,
nor did the location of the search deter the Court from holding that the expansively
worded warrant was valid. Although the warrant concluded with the phrase "together
with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown,"
id. at 479, the Court denied that the warrant was overbroad because they found that
the executing officers must have read the phrase in the context of the total warrant.
Id. at 480-81.
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vides a section 1983 action 18 for a person aggrieved by a search and
seizure in violation of the Act."s The Act further provides that actual
damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and other costs of litigation
reasonably incurred can be recovered.'89 A violation of the Act would
not, however, be grounds for suppressing otherwise admissible
evidence."9 The Guidelines, on the other hand, provide virtually no
enforcement incentives. They do not provide a civil cause of action
for the person aggrieved by a search in violation of the Guidelines.'
The only sanction available is that any federal officer or employee
who violates the Guidelines "shall be subject to appropriate adminis-
trative disciplinary action by the agency or department by which he
is employed." 112 Such an informal policy provides only an illusory
sanction and greatly diminishes the chances of effective deterrence
and punishment for violators of the Guidelines.'1
B. California Penal Code
California has adopted many of the protections essential to the
preservation of the attorney-client relationship in recent legislation
that serves as a compromise between the use of a search warrant and
a subpoena duces tecum.' u Under the statute, the State Bar Associa-
tion of California selects special masters '5 who will serve warrants
issued for the documents of nonsuspect attorneys. 96 Upon service,
the recipient attorney may either surrender the documents voluntar-
ily or assert that the document is privileged or confidential and
should not be disclosed.' When confidentiality is claimed, the mas-
ter will, without examination, seal the material in dispute and deliver
it to the court for a hearing similar to a proceeding to quash a
subpoena.' The hearing must be held within seventy-two hours if
187. Section 1983 creates a remedy for the violation of an individual's constitu-
tional rights by a state official acting under color of law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976);
e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 433 (1976) (White, J., concurring in the judgment); Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961). See generally Developments in the Law-Section
1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1133 (1977).
188. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, § 106(a), 94 Stat. 1880.
189. Id. § 106(f), 94 Stat. 1881.
190. Id. § 106(e), 94 Stat. 1881.
191. 46 Fed. Reg. 1302, 1304 (1981) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 59.5(b)).
192. Id. at 1304 (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 59.5(a)).
193. See Erburu, supra note 142, at 180.
194. Cal. Penal Code § 1524 (West Supp. 1981). The affidavit supporting an ap-
plication for a search warrant must specify whether the place to be searched is a law
office. Id. § 1525.
195. Id. § 1524(d) (West Supp. 1981).
196. Id. § 1524(c)(1) (West Supp. 1981).
197. Id.
198. Id. § 1524(c)(2) (West Supp. 1981).
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practicable, or if not, at the earliest possible time." This procedure
protects the client's interests because the attorney's compliance can
prevent a search, and the attorney, rather than the police, can gather
the information sought. More importantly, it provides an opportunity
for prior objection and impartial judicial determination of the mate-
rial's privileged status.
There are, however, problems with the procedure. One attorney
has said that the law is "unhealthy. There is an illusion of
protection." Although the opportunity for voluntary compliance or
objection way protect the client's rights, the attorney's interests are
not protected. The nonsuspect attorney is still subject to the disrup-
tive effect of the search procedure on his office and working day," '
and to the injury to reputation that may result following even such a
limited search.'
Moreover, pursuant to the legislation, a full search of a nonsuspect
attorney's office conducted by the special master may still occur if the
attorney in charge of the materials is unavailable to receive service of
the warrant and to comply or object to disclosure of the files.2k After
"reasonable efforts" to locate the attorney,2 the special master must
seal and take to the court any of the information sought that appears
to be privileged.2 05 This procedure requires the special master to
search the attorney's files and read the material so that a preliminary
determination of their privileged status may be made. Not only is the
privilege lost by this exposure but the special master may neglect to
seal materials that are privileged, thereby exposing them to the
police.0
A special master may also conduct a search if, in his judgment, the
attorney has failed to provide the items requested. Thus, situations
may exist when an attorney truthfully says that he does not possess
the materials sought, and the special master, disbelieving the attor-
ney, conducts a full search. This search would violate the privileges
and constitutional rights that protect the attorney-client relationship
and would, moreover, be an insult to the integrity of an innocent
attorney.2
The incidence of searches under the last exceptions will depend on
the character of the special master serving the warrant. Because a
199. Id.
200. Zurcher Law: Little Comfort to Lawyers, 67 A.B.A.J. 32, 33 (1981).
201. Search and Seizure, supra note 82, at 387.
202. Id.
203. Cal. Penal Code § 1524(c)(3) (West Supp. 1981).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Erburu, supra note 142, at 183-84.
207. Cal. Penal Code § 1524(c)(1) (West Supp. 1981).
208. Tarlow, supra note 6, at 30.
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special master must be an attorney, 29 he is more likely to feel
empathy for the attorney searched. As an attorney, however, he is
also likely to be under time constraints, and serving in this capacity
without compensation, 2 ' he is likely to avoid protracted
involvement. 21 1 Moreover, one commentator points out that the
State Bar Committee that selects the special masters will probably
not contain a sufficient number of criminal defense attorneys and,
therefore, may select attorneys without the requisite sensitivity to the
"dilemma faced by a criminal lawyer presented with a search
warrant." 1 2
Finally, a full scale search by the police of a nonsuspect attorney's
office may ensue regardless of the protections if a special master is
not available after reasonable efforts and would not be available with-
in a reasonable period of time. 213 The police executing the warrant
would be required to allow the attorney the opportunity to comply
voluntarily or to object to disclosure and could not search unless, in
their judgment, the attorney failed to provide the items requested."' 4
The opportunity to search is present, however, and the dangers
inherent in such a search by the police are realistically threatened.'
One final problem affects both the California legislation and the
Justice Department Guidelines. Under either protective scheme, a
comprehensive search could be conducted by the police, without an
accompanying special master, if the attorney is "reasonably
suspected" 216 of criminal activity in relation to the material sought, or
if the material sought is contraband, fruits of a crime, or
instrumentalities of a crime.2 17  Because of the interests adversely
affected by the search, a higher standard of probable cause should be
required for the attorney's involvement in the alleged crime before a
search warrant should be issued.18 Moreover, because the clients'
interest in the privacy of their files does not change when the attor-
ney is suspected of criminal wrongdoing, or when the files of one
client contain material subject to search and seizure, requirements
should be established that would limit the intrusiveness of a permissi-
209. Cal. Penal Code § 1524(d) (West Supp. 1981).
210. Id.
211. See Tarlow, supra note 6, at 30.
212. Id. at 30.
213. Cal. Penal Code § 1524(d) (West Supp. 1981).
214. Id.
215. See notes 133-34 supra and accompanying text.
216. 46 Fed. Reg. 1302, 1303 (1981) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 59.2(c)(1)); Cal.
Penal Code § 1524(c) (West Supp. 1981).
217. 46 Fed. Reg. 1302, 1303 (1981) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 59.2(d)); Cal.
Penal Code § 1524(c) (West Supp. 1981).
218. See notes 172-74 supra and accompanying text.
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ble law office search to protect the rights of the attorney's other
clients who will be adversely affected.1
C. Proposed Solutions
State legislators considering the problem posed by law office
searches must avoid the shortcomings of the Justice Department
Guidelines and the California legislation. Legislators might consider
the model provided by the probable cause requirements for eaves-
dropping and wiretapping devices found in the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act of 1968.20 The Act provides that the af-
fidavit for an aural eavesdropping device must establish that "normal
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reason-
ably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or too dangerous."," A
similar standard should be required for "visual" eavesdropping when
the police go through the written records of conversations between
an attorney and his client.
To comply with the requirement that a law office search be con-
ducted only when reasonable, the guidelines promulgated should be
a hybrid of the different schemes considered. The use of a search
warrant should be unlawful unless the police have probable cause to
believe that (1) the attorney is a criminal suspect with respect to the
materials sought,"' or (2) the material sought will be lost, altered,
destroyed, or concealed during the delay involved with using a
219. Deukmejian v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 253, 260, 162 Cal. Rptr.
857, 862 (1980) ("la]n attorney suspected of criminal activity should have the same
concerns about the confidentiality of files containing privileged matter as an innocent
third party attorney .. "). There may also be a problem with defining instrumenta-
lities of a crime too broadly and therefore including contracts, memoranda, and busi-
ness documentary materials because many white collar crimes involve tile use of such
materials. See Tarlow, supra note 6, at 30 n.24.
220. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1976).
221. Id.; see Bekavac, supra note 82, at 14.
222. See Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, § 101(a)(1). (b)(1), 94
Stat. 1879-80. This standard is consistent with Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463
(1976), in which the Court upheld the search of a suspect attornevs office without
addressing the interests of the clients affected by the search. In O'Connor r. John-
son, which held the search of a nonsuspect attorney's office to be unreasonable, the
court specified that a search could take place if the attorney is a suspect. O'Connor
v. Johnson, - Minn. _ 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (1979) (en banc); see, e.g., National
City Trading Corp. v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1332, 1335 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(attorney suspected of being involved with client in criminal enterprise); Webb v.
State, 580 P.2d 295, 300-01 (Alaska 1978) (attorney suspected of being an accessory
after the fact in client's murder case); Williams v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d
330, 337-38, 146 Cal. Rptr. 311, 314-15 (1978) (attorney suspected of receiving stolen
goods); Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 241-42, 529 P.2d 590. 591-92.
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subpoena,22 or (3) a subpoena has been served and the attorney has
failed to comply or respond within a specified time,"2 and (4) the
information cannot be obtained from some alternative source. M Addi-
tionally, a search warrant should be available when there is a life-
threatening emergency situation.2 26  The search in such a case,
however, should not proceed until the police have asked the attorney
to give them the information sought voluntarily.
As an alternative to the search warrant, the police should rely on a
subpoena duces tecum, a summons, or a simple request.7 Legisla-
tors concerned with the delay entailed in the use of a subpoena could
enact a requirement of a forthwith subpoena,m which commands the
recipient to deliver the material immediately. Because a forthwith
subpoena, like a warrant, is issued ex parte, there is little risk that
obtaining a subpoena will disclose to the suspect the police interest in
the information. The legislation could provide that the requested
materials be delivered to the court for an in camera inspection to
determine its status as privileged or unprivileged.
118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 168-69 (1975) (en bane) (attorney suspected of misappropriating
client's funds).
223. See Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, § 101(b)(3), 94 Stat.
1879-80; 46 Fed. Reg. 1302, 1303-04 (1981) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. §§ 59.1(b),
59.4(c)(1)). This standard is consistent with Justice Stevens's view in Zurcher v. Stan-
ford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, (1978) that -[t]he only conceivable justification for an un-
announced search of an innocent citizen is the fear that, if notice were given, he
would conceal or destroy the object of the search." Id. at 582 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
224. See Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96440, § 101(b)(4), 94 Stat.
1880. The Act provides that in the event that a warrant is sought for failure to
comply with a subpoena the person possessing the material should be afforded
"adequate opportunity to submit an affidavit setting forth the basis for any contention
that the materials sought are not subject to seizure." Id. § 101(c), 94 Stat. 1880. The
provision should apply to law office searches as well.
225. See Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 50 F.R.D. 225, 227 (N.D. Cal. 1970)
(if the information sought is known to both laymen and lawyers, the laymen should
first be examined to avoid the "awkward and undignified procedure of requiring a
lawyer to first reveal matters communicated to him by clients"); Bloom, supra note
9, at 61-63.
226. See Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96440, § 101(a)(2), (b)(2), 94
Stat. 1879-80; Erburu, supra note 142, at 176.
227. See Bloom, supra note 9, at 77-79. "[T]here is no reason why police officers
executing a warrant should not seek the cooperation of the subject party, in order to
prevent needless disruption." Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 570 n.2
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
228. See Consumer Credit Ins. Agency v. United States, 599 F.2d 770 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980); United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); United States v. Re, 313 F. Supp. 442
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Bloom, supra note 9. at 36; Bekavac, supra note 82, at 13.
LAW OFFICE SEARCHES
When a search warrant is used, the police should be required to
limit the intrusiveness of the search as much as possible. 3 Thus, the
warrant must be exact as to the nature, description, and location of
the evidence sought. Additionally, a special master should accompany
the police and seal the files that the attorney alleges are privileged or
confidential, delivering them to the court for in camera inspection.'
Furthermore, the plain view doctrine should be made inapplicable to
law office searches.2'
After the search, the police should give the attorney a complete list
of the materials removed and the files examined so that he can assess
his client's legal position.3 A hearing should be held at the earliest
possible opportunity to ascertain the status of the materials seized. In
addition, the attorney should be able to secure the prompt return of
materials essential for trial preparation m
Any proposed legislative scheme should also include sanctions for
searches conducted in violation of the legislation. Such a scheme
should be designed to eliminate undesirable conduct. This can be
done by creating deterrence incentives and by clearly articulating the
proscribed conduct to educate those who would comply. An effective
enforcement scheme additionally should compensate the victim of the
improper conduct by giving him an opportunity for redress and by
creating some standards for compensation.' As under the Privacy
Protection Act, a section 1983 action should be available for damages,
and the costs of litigation should be recoverable. Furthermore, a pro-
vision should be made for sanctions within the agency of the official
who violated the guidelines.23
These recommended procedures would ensure that a law office
search could occur only when reasonable, as defined by Justice
Powell's criteria in Zurcher. Maximum protection is accorded to
the nonsuspect attorney and his clients by limiting the instances of
purposeful intrusion and by clearly defining when a search would be
229. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978) ("[wjhere presump-
tively protected materials are sought to be seized, the warrant requirement should
be administered to leave as little as possible to the discretion or whim of the officer
in the field"); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976) ('[iln searches
for papers, it is certain that some innocuous documents will be examined .... re-
sponsible officials . . .must take care to assure that [searches] are conducted in a
manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy*); Bloom, supra note 9,
at 66-71 (recommendation that police be required to submit a search plan, and that
the warrant be drawn with scrupulous exactitude).
230. See Cal. Penal Code § 1524(c)(1) (West Supp. 1981).
231. See Bloom, supra note 9, at 85-87; notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
232. See Bloom, supra note 9, at 87-88.
233. Id. at 88-89; see note 100 supra and accompanying text.
234. Erburu, supra note 142, at 180.
235. See notes 187-93 supra and accompanying text.
236. See notes 52-57 supra and accompanying text.
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allowed. Law enforcement interests are protected by allowing the use
of a search warrant when there is probable cause to believe that a
less intrusive method would result in the loss of the evidence. The
dual interests of society in the effective functioning of the adversary
system and in the enforcement of criminal law are thus fullfilled.
CONCLUSION
The idea of a law office search is startling. It cannot be denied,
however, that extensive law office searches have occurred and will
continue to occur. 37 Indeed, now that the Justice Department
Guidelines regulating federally conducted searches have been pub-
lished, state officials who had not previously considered the law office
search as a viable means of securing evidence about a nonsuspect
attorney's client may be seeking ex parte warrants for unannounced
searches.
The integrity of the adversary system and the fairness of trials are
undermined by the invasion of the prosecutor in the defense attor-
ney's office. "[I]t cannot be said too often that what is involved far
transcends the fate of some sordid offender. Nothing less is involved
than that which makes for an atmosphere of freedom as against a
feeling of fear and repression for society as a whole. The dangers are
not fanciful. We too readily forget them." 2
Pamela Gurfein
237. Attorneys concerned with the safety of their files can do several things. They
should initiate discussions in their state bar associations. In California, the protective
legislation that was passed was largely the brainchild of the Los Angeles County Bar
Association and was enacted through its efforts. Mandel, Law Enforcement Searches
of Law Firm Offices, 51 Okla. B.J. 707, 708 (1980). Attorneys should also support by
aggressive amicus participation any nonsuspect third party lawyers whose offices are
searched. Id. at 709. Attorneys should consider reorganizing their office files because
the more carefully itemized a file system is, the more easily the police can conduct
their search and avoid rummaging. Id. Finally, attorneys should draft model tempo-
rary restraining orders to have available in the event that a search is threatened.
238. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 173 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing), overruled, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See also Nat'l C. Dist.
Attorneys, Ethical Considerations In Prosecution 9-12 (1977). "The responsibility of a
public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice,
not merely to convict." Id. at 9 (footnote omitted).
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